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A FEW THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS CARRINGTON
AND CRAMTON
Honorable Patrick E. Higginbothamt

The efforts ofJustices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen Breyer
to provoke examination of the vitality of the American judiciary's independence have inspired two conferences,' which in turn have produced many thoughtful papers and much commentary. I have been
asked to respond to one such paper offered by Professors Paul Car2
rington of Duke and Roger Cramton of Cornell.
These two distinguished scholars see the Court as its own enemy,
threatened by internal practices and changing relationships with state
courts and the inferior federal courts. The authors decry this system
because it enables, or at least facilitates, the Justices' present roles as
"superlegislators." To their eyes, the Supreme Court is playing off the
field, outside boundaries that, while hazy at their margins, have clear
limits rooted in principles of separation of powers and judicial tradition. As the authors put it: "When judges assume the role of
lawmakers, as when they impart principles into the Constitution that
have scant textual base, or when they choose to disregard or stretch
the text of valid legislation, they invite political accountability of the
sort to which we subject our legislators."3
Although Professors Carrington and Cramton fall short of providing a complete remedy, their proposal lends definition to the ills it
would treat. The authors start by offering a brief history of the
Court's ascension. They then offer an example of superlegislation
that they call "the absence of judicial independence caused by
superlaw governing judicial elections."'4 They assert that "the Court
has by its edicts made it virtually impossible for many states to assure
the appropriate independence of their judiciaries," finding "[t]he impact upon the elections of judges, state constitutions require in order
t

Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
I Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on Judicial Independence, Selection
and Accountability, SMU Dedman School of Law (Apr. 4, 2007); Fair and Independent
Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary, Georgetown University Law Center
(Sept. 28-29, 2006).
2 Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, JudicialIndependence in Excess: Reviving the
JudicialDuty of the Supreme Coude, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 594 (2009).
3 Id. at 587.
4 Id. Part II.
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to provide a measure of democratic accountability for their politicized
'5
judiciaries, has been especially consequential.
According to Professors Carrington and Cramton, much of the
change in the inferior federal courts, appellate and trial, is linked to
the Justices' alleged roles as platonic guardians of constitutional values detached from the mundane daily duties of examining facts, applying law to facts, and explaining decisions. The authors identify
"secondary effects on lower courts of the Supreme Court's role as
superlegislature," citing a litany of present ills of the lower courts.
These ills range from their lack of transparency and reliance on unpublished opinions, to their increasing delegation of functions to expanding staffs and embrace of arbitration and declining trials. The
authors point the finger at the Supreme Court for its decisions on fact
pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and its encouragement of motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. The authors
suggest that changes such as excessive delegation to law clerks and
staffs, coupled with declining oral arguments and trials, reflect emulation of the Court by the lower courts.
THE PROPOSAL

The proposal would withdraw much of the discretion of the Supreme Court to choose its own cases. Using the Act of February 13,
1925 (which replaced much of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction
with the writ of certiorari) as a baseline, 7 the authors compare the 330
cases per year the Court was then deciding with its present load of
about eighty selected cases per year. They argue that this reduction is
in large part a product of the delegation to the "cert pool" of law

clerks by all Justices save Justices Stevens and Alito. They would
replace the "cert pool" of law clerks with a panel of experienced
federal judges. These judges would be empowered to hear all petitions for certiorari and evaluate the petitions on the basis of standards supplied by Congress. They would place a specified and
substantial number of cases on the docket of the Court, and the
8
Court would be obligated to decide these cases their merits.
This panel of judges, the "Certiorari Division of the Supreme Court,"
would select 120 or so cases per year that the Supreme Court would be
obliged to decide. This would leave the Supreme Court to pick another one hundred or so cases if it wished to do so. This body of

judges would issue no rulings or opinions.
5

Id. at 609-10.

6

Id. at 617.

Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-94 (2006)).
8 Carrington & Cranton, supra note 2, at 632.
7
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The authors' proposal identifies five benefits. First, this new system "would restore the Supreme Court to the more judicial and less
legislative role that it generally performed prior to 1925. The Justices,
like real judges, would have to decide many cases placed on their
docket."9 With this return to mandatory jurisdiction the Court would
once again work under the shelter of Chief Justice John Marshall's
justification offered in Marbuy v. Madison1 for judicial power to review legislation-that the court was obligated to decide.11 Second, the
time saved by relief from the cert review process could be focused on
the mandatory docket. Third, the selection of cases would be made by
judges in the best position to know the issues of national law in need
of attention. Fourth, it would add prestige to the federal appeals
courts. Fifth, it would add transparency to the process of selecting
cases for Supreme Court review. This might in turn encourage transparency in the inferior courts.
Despite these predicted benefits, Professors Carrington and
Cramton's proposal rests on a singular premise: "[t]he power to decide what to decide was a major factor in the transformation of the
Court in the last century as the Justices became noticeably less constrained in making political decisions."'12
THE PERCEIVED WRONG

The title of the article suggests disquiet with the Supreme Court's
present role of exercising power that properly lies with the Congress,
the President, or the States. The description of its errancy points to
an inability to treat lawmaking as an incident of dispute resolution.
Instead, the Court is said to use cases and controversies to rule with an
accent on prospective effects-making large social and political decisions to govern the future direction of the country.' 3 The authors see
this legislative role as arising in the post-1925 years of the twentieth
century. The year 1925 is significant because it marks the virtual end
of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which the authors view as an enabling, if not a directly producing, cause of the
judiciary's rise as a superlegislature. As their article puts it: "legisla9
10

Id. at 634.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

11
Id. at 178 ("[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is
of the veto essence of judicial duty.") (emphasis added).
12 Carrington & Cramton, supra note 2, at 605.
13
Id. at 590 (describing the Court as a "'superlegislature' that sits chiefly to proclaim
new law to govern future transactions and relations") (citing Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court?, 119 IARv. L. REv. 32, 35-39 (2005)).
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tion allowing Justices to decide only those few legal and political issues
that they choose to decide" is a "[s]ignificant element in the Court's
role as superlegislature.'

u4

Somewhat in tension with this 1925 marker, 15 the authors also
point to Chief Justice Marshall's jurisprudence and the introduction
of written opinions. They argue that states early on recognized the
potential for judicial excess and therefore acted to rein in state courts
with term limits and elective office. Similar responses were not directed to federal courts because they were part of a federal government that was viewed as largely ineffectual.' 6 The authors observe
that "[a] lmost no contested policy of substantial national concern that
the Court announced in the nineteenth century was effectively
17
maintained.'
The argument continues that in the early part of the twentieth
century there was a general sense of inherent limits upon the range of
governance deployed through judicial decision making in cases or
controversies. But in 1947, that constraint fell away, or at least was
eroded, with the success of the Court in the Steel Seizure case,' 8 which
set the stage for an emboldened Court's willingness to overturn Plessy
v. Ferguson 9 in the school desegregation cases. 2

The authors con-

tinue that "[b]y 1961, the Court... was prepared to take on numerous other assignments," embracing Professor Sanford Levinson's
observation that many lawyers and legal scholars had by this time
come to think of constitutional interpretation "the way that the Catholic Church has traditionally thought of scripture as a text truly understood only by those high clergymen professionally invested in its
2
interpretation." '

14

Id. at 591.

15

As the authors indicate, the starting point for discretionary jurisdiction is best

drawn from the Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)), extended by the Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat.
726.
16
The Marshall Court's decisions, however, were also met with concern. "Inthe Marshall Court years, especially during the 1820s, those who perceived a tendency toward centralization in the Court's decisions proposed repealing section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act,
which authorized Supreme Court review of certain state court judgments." Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to CurtailFederal CourtJurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. Rrv. 895, 896-97 (1984).
17 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 2, at 599.
18 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

See, e.g., Brown v.Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Carrington & Cramton, supra note 2, at 603-04 (citing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONS'n
TLTIONAL FAITH 46-50 (1988))
20
21
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BRIEF RESPONSE

Professors Carrington and Cramton's proposal creates two sets of
problems. The first set raises concerns that go to the heart of the
proposal to reign in the Supreme Court. The second set involves several of the specific concerns the authors see as traveling companions
to the present excesses of the Court, such as the decline of trials and
increasing morphing of federal trial courts to administrative-like
courts.
At the outset I should disclose that I agree that most of the ills
sought be remedied are real and troubling. Some of these ills, such as
the changing work of the trial courts, pose serious challenges to their
independence. Indeed, I see these changes as eroding the foundations of Article III. And while I remain doubtful of the effectiveness of
the proposed remedy, I agree that allocation of the power to decide
what to decide is a cardinal question: it enhances the Court's power to
shape the law, a statement that is little more than a recognition of
Arrow theory and the common sense intuition that the sequence of
decisions matters a great deal. That said, to my eye, the article understates the timing tools at the hands of the Court operating under a
regime of "mandatory jurisdiction," and their treatment of cases selected by others as appropriate for Supreme Court review.
Returning to first principles, I am uncertain whether the ills the
proposal attempts to treat also include exceeding the jurisdictional
grants of Article III and the consent of Congress. Regardless, any
challenge to the justification of unelected and unaccountable officials
in a representative republic must admit the existence of congressional
power over the federal courts. That power is real. With it, Congress
can withdraw appellate jurisdiction from or alter the size of the Supreme Court. And the specter of the Madisonian Compromise looms
over the inferior courts, leaving open the possibility that Congress can
destroy that which it created. That Congress lacks the political will to
exercise its power is not an answer but a concession that in this most
basic way the Court is not acting without congressional approval-or
at least acquiescence. 22 Professors Carrington and Cramton tacitly
recognize this reality, by proposing that Congress remedy the excesses
22

That tenured judges should enjoy such power, on the basis of "law" so understood, is to me a thing not to be accepted just because it was brought
into being in 1788. Nor could I be satisfied with a fictitious or mystical
"popular consent," not expressed in a positive way by the people's elected
representatives. I think that the whole apparatus should be dismantled inless one can say (as I do say) that Congress, representing the democracy
from year to year, right now in 1981 could seriously diminish this allocation
of policy power to tenured judges, and has instead chosen, and still
chooses, not to do so.

CHARLES L. BLACK JR., DECISION AC cORDLING To LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES 26

(1981).

I would add that this continues right now in 2009.
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of the Court. I do not suggest that turning to Congress is not the
correct path. Indeed, as the proposal stresses, the main culprit here is
the consequences of legislation from the Evarts Act 2 to the Judges
Bill of 1925.24 So, abstractly, remedy and wrong are a neat fit. The

reality of course is that gradual tailoring over an eight-decade span
has complicated matters. The federal judicial apparatus in operation
today, as distinguished from its 1925-charted form, is hardly
recognizable.
Further, we have to ask what would result from this withdrawal.
The proposal sheds some light on the answer in its description of what
discretionary jurisdiction has wrought. Yet this is not a simple extraction. Answering this question requires us to identify the forces that
have shaped the present model of a case or controversy. Identification would allow us to examine the assertion that much of the judiciary's change in shape is attributable not just to decisions of the Court,
but to its decisions enabled by its power to decide what to decide.
We must further inquire into the effect of both congressional acts
that tasked the judiciary with broad-gauged assignments as well as Supreme Court decisions that effectively turned back ombudsmen-like
roles that the Congress, as the representative branch, would have had
it assume.
Long before the Judges Bill, Congress looked to the federal
courts to enforce its statutory norms by providing private rights of action. For example, in promulgating antitrust laws, Congress made
broad statements outlawing any contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, but left to the federal courts the task of
giving content to trade regulation. Only later with the Clayton Act did
Congress supplement governmental enforcement by granting a private right of action to persons injured in their trade or business by
25
conduct violative of this general proscription.
A century of "federal common law" followed, embodied by economic theory strained through the eyes ofjurists and enforced in suits
by "private attorneys general." This trend included securities, labor,
and patent law, which all allowed for cases to be brought far removed
from the classic binary model of common law litigation. This congressional use of the courts became so familiar that even when Congress
did not directly provide a private remedy the Court would imply it.
Eventually, rather than continue down that path-one that gave the
23 Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)).
24 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-94 (2006)).
25 See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (treble damages); id.
§ 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (injunctive relief).
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Court a large say about social policy in a wide array of matters such as
the environment, civil rights, and the stock markets-the Court told
the Congress that any intent to have judicial involvement had to be
clearly stated. This sounded the demise of implied private rights. The
larger point is that it was the Congress that introduced the Court to
these large social issues.
26
Not that the Court needed it. Recall that the Lochner era,
roughly 1905 through 1937, was discredited for its activist draw upon
Darwinian-influenced economics to strike down New Deal legislation
intended to jump start a failed economy. It is difficult to make the
case that the Judges Bill was central to this aggressive run by the
Court. Without diminishing the importance of the power to decide
when to decide, it bears emphasis that with mandatory jurisdiction,
the decision of when to decide passes-to the extent it passes to anyone-largely to counsel for litigants. And many of our landmark decisions from the Court came in "set up" cases such as Plessy itself27
Indeed, the NAACP largely controlled the timing of the attack upon
the separate but equal holding of Plessy.
There is another side of the coin: the avoidance of decision during a time of mandatory jurisdiction. Recall the repeated efforts to
have the Court review the constitutionality of the Reconstruction legislation. This effort to free the South from a congressionally imposed
hegemony of dubious constitutionality was frustrated by the Court
and the Congress. 28 For now I only remind of the familiar, that congressional use of private suits to enforce federal law brought federal
courts into the day to day task of enforcing broad-gauged federal
norms against private persons and businesses. This soon included enforcement against state and federal agencies.
The rise of the administrative state and the public law model of
litigation is hardly the creature of the Supreme Court. Rather this rise
was marked by judicial diffidence and not arrogation. Justice Stevens'
majority opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
26

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also, e.g., Adkins v. Children's

Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
27

See CHARLES A.

LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

(1987).
28

SeeExparteYerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869); ExparteMcCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)

506 (1869); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 475 (1867). It bears mentioning that congressional withdrawal of habeasjurisdiction may well have taken the Court from the crosshairs of determined congressional assault. The power to decide what to decide is not always deployed to take charge of matters
best left to the political branches. And while the Congress effectively let the Court off the
hook in the ±lcCardleaffair, the Court has the tools to duck when it elects to do so even

when jurisdiction is "mandated." Maibuy itself is a classic example. The Court's wheeling
out of abstention and the doctrine of clear statement are illustrative.
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Council, Inc.,29 one of the most important decisions of the Court in
recent years, pulled the federal courts back from the lawmaking of
administrative agencies. But this was not the first such exercise of
modesty. The rise of the administrative agencies played a key, if not
decisive, role in the growth of the doctrine of standing, a little known
word as late as the early 1950s. The Court relied on the doctrines of
justiciability in response to the increasing number of suits asking the
federal courts to order governmental bodies to obey the law. These
examples of judicial modesty do not necessarily undercut the assertion that the Court has, first in matters of personal liberties and more
recently in matters of federalism, cut or stretched the tethers of constitutional text. Rather, these examples further inform the need for an
appropriate remedy.
True to the commands of Article III and the principles of separation of powers, the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife"" insisted that
a plaintiff have an injury caused by the government's conduct and
that the injury not be suffered in common with all citizens. Equally
important, the Court required that the injury be redressable by a
favorable judgment. Against this backdrop of judicial caution of its
role, Congress gave all citizens a right to sue to enforce the Endangered Species Act, a statute that imposed a duty upon federal agencies
to consult with the Secretary of the Interior before proceeding with
agency-funded projects that threaten endangered species. The Lujan
Court found that the Act violated Article III in attempting to allow a
citizen without direct, individual injury to enlist a federal judge as a
virtual ombudsman. And while standing, abstention, and political
question doctrines can be cast as efforts to garner control over case
selection, resistance to mandatory decision making is not inevitably
aggrandizing. A gentle reminder that the political question doctrine
had its seeding in Marbuiy itself.
Historically, the Court has been on occasion modest in its vision
of the judicial role and on other occasions self-aggrandizing. The latter is often read as a strong reaction to perceived incursions upon
judicial turf. Think here of City of Boerne v. Flores."'
The rich path of the Equal Protection Clause is instructive. As
the Court developed tiered levels of judicial scrutiny-strict, intermediate, rational basis, and rationality with a bite-it balked at extending
the highest levels beyond race, to gender for example. Significantly,
2
in Washington v. Davis,73
by insisting that a party make a showing of
purpose, which thereby negated the adequacy of showing effects
29
30

31
32

467
504
521
426

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

837
555
507
229

(1984).
(1992).
(1997).
(1976).
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alone, the Court turned back pleas for a greater judicial role in a
range of social issues. It also refused to extend the list of fundamental
interests that would trigger strict scrutiny, leaving these large
problems to the political process.
This fluctuation between diffidence and aggrandizement across
the Court's docket is not new. Recall the carve out of personal liberties made explicit in Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone's famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.33 V'While disavowing
the Lochner line3 4 of aggressive review of congressional efforts to regulate in the economic sphere, that footnote made plain that the Court
would carefully scrutinize government conduct impacting personal
liberties.
As for federalism, the Rehnquist Court's aggressive march from
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida3 5 to the ultimate conclusion that state
immunity from money damages is not grounded in the Eleventh
Amendment after all, but was rather a presupposition of the Constitution, can be viewed as that Court's own carve-out. It is fair to question
the role, if any, of case selection in both of these aggressive moves. In
popular but misleading language, one moves in a liberal direction and
the other moves in a conservative direction. Inevitably, I think, one's
take on which, if either, of these two lines suffer the accused vice will
be influenced by the "correctness" of the result and its fit with one's
vision of the constitutional order of things. (The majority and dissenting opinions in the Seminole Tribe line of cases exemplify this tension.)
This is not a defense of the Court. It is rather to ask why we
should assume that members of the bench, the bar, and the academy
will not split somewhere along the same lines as the Court has, each
side convinced that the others have "left the reservation" and are implementing a personal agenda. Is it that the whole enterprise was impermissibly political or that one was and one was not? These
questions tax the implicit premise of Professors Carrington and Cramton's proposal that in matters of constitutional law there is one locatable and defensible path. Or perhaps more accurately, that outside
boundaries are marked. But directions for the correct path to follow
need to be more clear than urgings to adhere to the "the text of the
Constitution" or to "read strictly" or "loosely." The proposal does not
wade into the textualist debates or offer concrete advice beyond "go
easy and slow and obey the constitutional commands." It rather
would take back the power to decide when to decide for such value as
it may have in checking the broad role of governance the Court has
come to have; however, the authors intend to leave the Court be with
33
34

35

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See cases cited supra note 26.
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
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its internal debates in the cases that it must decide. They fail to provide any new discipline in the choice of issues in a case or in the writing of its opinions. While their article argues that the Court's political
decisions have taken it into the political arena, which insists on accountability, the proposed remedy does not pretend to halt the occasional outlier. Mandatory jurisdiction is offered as a measure of
remission at best, and as a pain killer at worst. But neither provides a
cure of the illness.
Given these limits of the proposal, the invocation of Brown v.
Board of Education" is a distraction. The article expresses concern for
the constitutional footing of this decision, the results of which it of
course applauds. It hints that the Court erred in cutting off bottomsup progress in race relations. All of this gave me, a child of the deep
South, pause. First, if timing was the Court's mistake or otherwise an
unfortunate product of the decision, how would a mandatory docket
have changed things, given the plaintiffs' litigation strategy? Would a
mandatory docket have forced a decision even earlier in frustration of
the NAACP's strategy of moving slowly at the college level before turning to secondary education? If racial progress was moving apace without the support of the Court, mandatory jurisdiction could have in
fact stifled that progress, which rested in part on the sequence of decisions exposing the reality of separate but equal. Ahen to offer a frontal challenge of the Plessy doctrine was seen as a grave decision by
leaders in the black civil rights struggle; lawyer Thurgood Marshall
and leaders of the NAACP and Inc. Fund were not always of the same
37
mind here.
Additionally, it turns the questioning to the familiar interpretivist/non-interpretivist debate with hints that the decision is not defensible as a legal matter. 8 The Plessy Court read the Fourteenth
Amendment one way; a half-century later, the Brown Court read it
differently. It is impossible to locate a relevant and clear meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause in text alone. Thus, the differences between the Plessy and Brown Courts lie only superficially with their treatment of structural inference and history. I am uncertain how the
authors see this struggle.
36

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

37

See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERnIA IN THE KING YEARs, 1954-63
(1988); RI{CHARD KIJEULR, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUIATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGILE FOR EQcU ALTy (2004).
38
That has become a popular discussion point in Federalist Society meetings, in part
I suspect because it tests the conservative
under an icon. See, e.g., Federalist Society
Lawyers Convention, CelebratingBrown v.
Are We DoingF7ty Years Later? Nov. 11-13,
here.

mettle of young lawyers to cut the legs out from
for Law and Public Policy Studies, 2004 National
Board of Education 's Promise of Equality: How We
2004, Washington, D.C. I think it is a distraction
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With the advantage of a long backward look, to my eyes the differences lie with the profound cultural changes coming in the nigh six
decades separating the decisions, whether or not it makes one decision more appropriate for the judiciary than the other-unless, that
is, one takes the view that Plessy's acceptance of the legality of state
separation of races properly found social neutrality in government insistence upon racial separation. Such a vision of state neutrality was
then and is now an illusion, robbing of all content the assurance of
equal protection of the laws for blacks, the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Separate but equal was always a fiction. The people
knew it and the Court exposed it. Brown did not step on a growing
underlying consensus of its falsity; rather, it tapped into it and by its
decision released it from its legal trap. Unfortunately, Brown's
unearned credits for racial success has encouraged the academy's subscription to an aggressive judicial review, which when aimed in other
directions, it would denounce-a point the article correctly makes. I
find it difficult to fault the Supreme Court for saying no to a reading
of the assurance of equal protection of the laws that would refuse admission to the University of Texas School of Law to a person solely
because he was black. 39 Without that lesser step and the other predicate decisions, Brown would have been even more difficult. Professors
Carrington and Cramton point to Brown as giving confidence to federal courts of the effectiveness of their decrees and fueling further
excesses. This conclusion suggests that the claimed successes should
not be credited to that decision. With that, if I am reading the article
fairly, I can agree only in part. It is not that I see the Court as the sole
or even the most effectual branch in pushing race out of the mix in
government decision making. Rather, the premises of Brown, while
not well put in the opinion, are straightforward and could not be escaped without leaving the constitutional assurance of equal protection
empty of meaning. As Professor Charles Black summarizes them, the
assurance was "that the Fourteenth Amendment is to be taken as generally condemning the infliction of harm, by law, on blacks as blacks,
and that segregation by law, in the notorious circumstances prevailing, was a harm. These premises are a long way within the safe range
''4 °
of supportability in law.
Baker v. Car,4 1 which came nine years later, is a better exemplar
for the article's charge. That it had extraordinary impact did not
strengthen the Court's warrant to decide it. This is because the Court
chose one political theory of representation over another when both
had constitutional legitimacy. As Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by
39

Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

40

BLACK, supra note 22, at 33 (citation omitted).

41

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Justice John Marshall Harlan II, put it: Baker was "in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label. '42 That said,
the political branch largely embraced the decision in voting rights
legislation .43
Much of the difficulty is inherent in constitutional law itself. I am
unsure how Professors Carrington and Cramton would prefer that the
Court proceed. How for example ought the Court address the "liberty" protected in the Fourteenth Amendment? Should it have confined the guarantee of liberty by the Fourteenth Amendment to
freedom from physical restraint? More to the point, for those persuaded that the present role of the Court ought to be cabined, how
would mandatory jurisdiction offer any practical hope? The Fourteenth Amendment worked a constitutional revolution. It imposed
constraints directly upon the states, enforceable by the Congress and
by the courts when presented in the form of cases and controversies.
The struggle over the relationship between the constraints upon the
federal government and the constraints placed upon the states by the
command that no state deny persons life, liberty, or property without
due process of law was inherent-and in my view, inescapable-in the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. And I take Justice Harlan's
as the most defensible path in the incorporation debate.
The authors suggest that the role of the Court with forward-looking focus upon governance has infected the inferior courts; they suggest that both federal trial and appellate courts have avoided decision
making by excessive delegation and by turning away cases summarily,
moving toward a role of governance mirroring the Supreme Court. It
is true that courts of appeal hear oral argument in an increasingly
small percentage of their cases, decide a large number of cases without published opinion, and have attempted to deny precedential effect to them. The federal appellate courts also deploy large numbers
of staff council and hand off administrative tasks to court clerks and
circuit executives with their swelling staffs. Professors Carrington and
Cramton also point to the employ of four law clerks by each circuit
judge with delegation to these bright lads and lasses of much, sometimes all, of the opinion writing.
These assertions are accurate in my experience, although a bit
overstated. They do not accurately describe the ways of all circuit
judges. For example, I hire only two clerks. As for the increased role
of staff counsel, the Fifth Circuit has more than fifty able lawyers in
Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
There were, however, rumblings from the Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 11926, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (proposing to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction over matters
relating to apportionment); Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63
MICH.L. REv. 255 (1964).
42

43
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New Orleans alone. The growth is attributable to the large number of
sentencing guidelines and other criminal appeals, as well as petitions
for habeas corpus attacking state court convictions. While capital
habeas petitions brought in the Fifth Circuit against state convictions
demand much judicial attention, a significant percentage of the Fifth
Circuit's docket needs staff attention but ultimately little judicial time.
That said, there is no necessity for four law clerks in a circuit judge's
chambers. And here I share the author's concern. There are larger
concerns than these for the appellate courts, but those concerns are
derivative of the changed role of the United States district courts, to
which I now turn.
The present plight of the federal trial court did not suddenly
spring upon us. Nearly thirty years ago I expressed dismay at the
growing bureaucracy in the federal judiciary at a luncheon talk at an
ABA Annual Convention. 44 I pointed to the tendency of administrative dispute resolution systems, created as alternatives to judicial roles,
to emulate judicial models in defiance of the reasons for creating
them. The successful effort of hearing examiners to be called
'judges" was emblematic of this tendency. I thought then that magistrates and referees would follow, albeit with a better claim for a judicial role. I was correct in pointing to a movement of administrators
toward judicial models. But I failed to grasp the full power of a confluent current pulling the district courts toward the administrative
model. I was wary of the Magistrate Act's invitation to district judges
to delegate, the justification being to free the district judges to try
cases. Perversely, the magistrates, later "magistrate judges," an able
group of lawyers, became the enablers of out of control civil discovery, 45 reducing the portion of trials the districtjudges were to handle.
I did not immediately connect the confluence of the magistrate system and the 1938 Rules of Civil Procedure. Others, such as Professors
46
Judith Resnik and Arthur Miller, have explained it well.
The plain fact is that this system has promoted private litigation.
In brief, the 1938 Rules took much of the case away from the courthouse and brought it to the conference rooms of law firms. At the
same time, districtjudges turned much of the pretrial management of
44
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the FederaIjudiciar, 31 ALA.
L. Rrv. 261 (1980); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr.Memorial
Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Wy Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. Rvv.
1405 (2002); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Mahon Lecture, 12 TEx. WESLEYAN L. RLV. 501
(2006).
45 For a larger discussion of this point, see sources cited supra note 44.
46 The concept that escape from the technicalities of common law and equity pleading with pretrial discovery would facilitate settlement and reduce trials succeeded, but for
profoundly wrong and unforeseen reasons: discovery became prohibitively extensive and
expensive. See generally Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REv.
1101 (2006).
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the case to the magistrate judges. Rule 56 motions for summaryjudgment, aided by the famous trilogy from the Court, replaced the trial as
the main event. Trial and pre-trial became increasingly disconnected,
taking away the already vaporous standard of relevance in discoverywhether it "could lead to admissible evidence." The processing of
cases with little or no expectation of trial became quite familiar to
district courts as they handled thousands of suits filed by prisoners pro
se. The result was a large docket with few trials.
These large numbers of cases, most decided on paper with no
hearings, move through the court system, ground out by successive
layers of staff council and law clerks. Into this mix came globalization,
which with the growth in transnational business transactions gave life
to the arbitration of complex matters.
That the decisions of the Court have played some role, perhaps a
large role, in this complex of circumstances, is plain. I would point by
way of example to the Court's nigh-casual reduction of the size of the
civil jury, from twelve to six persons, and its overlong tolerance of punitive damages, which alone contributed greatly to the destabilization
of jury trials. This is not to rehearse the debate; it is to make the
modest point that the power of the Court to decide what it will decide
is not a major factor in the changes that I am persuaded are of grave
consequence. Professors Carrington and Cramton charge the Court
with part of the responsibility for these evils, pointing to decisions embracing arbitration. While I agree that these decisions assisted the
precipitous decline of trials, I do not see the changing role of district
courts in hierarchical terms so much as a move of the entire judicial
system toward a European civil law model.
There is much afoot here and I have no easy fixes to suggest. The
causation is nuanced and difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless, the
reality of these trends is undeniable. We all see the symptoms. It is
etiology that eludes.
If the decisions of the Court challenged in the article do not represent popular will, Congress has the power to rein in the Court.
The difficulty is that in exercising its power, Congress may well turn
the Court from its present role, which could generate unforeseen collateral risk to matters that are not at issue and for which there is no
consensus for change. A legislative consensus in support of a Supreme Court decision resolving a constitutional issue does not validate it. It does, however, tend to reduce the interest in any possible
congressional response.
WHERE

WE

ARE

There is a powerful argument that the Court's overly aggressive
judicial review has done much harm. Professor Robert Nagel's
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thoughtful book states it well, and I will not rehearse it here. 47 My
disagreement with the article is that I am not persuaded of the proposed remedy. Nonetheless, the article is a provocative and useful enterprise because it provokes examination of judicial review. In the
long term the Court will be reined in only when judges are refused
iconic status for imposing outcomes on the citizenry that are often
little more than the moral vision of unelected officials. The assumption is that circuit judges, because they will only select cases for decision by the Court, will be free of the impulses that lead to judicial
excess. The strengths and weaknesses of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence has been the subject of an extraordinary amount of discussion-in the public press, the law reviews, and the myriad scholarly
publications. The legal academy has left little unturned or unexamined. The ill the proposal would remedy has been at the center of this
swirl. The author's proposed remedy is attractive because it would
lessen the discretion of the Court to decide what it will decide rather
than urge the Court to follow different approaches to its work that
might afford discipline to a more modest, less legislative role. Regrettably, however, this leaves the proposal's likely effectiveness largely
unaddressed. It bears mention again that the Court not only wrote
the Judges Bill; it lobbied hard for it too. The Court effectively transformed the cases left in place by Congress under mandatory jurisdiction into a discretionary docket by its use of summary affirmance and
insistence upon a showing of a "substantial" federal interest. This
brought about the demise of the three-judge courts. Meanwhile, the
Court obtained virtually complete power to decide what it would decide, which was an easy sell to Congress. After all, Congress was only
validating an operating reality. 48 The point is that one should not
underestimate judicial power defensively deployed by nine very able
lawyers supported by very able staff; nor should one underestimate the
Court's predictably aggressive defense of its domain.
Relatedly, the assumption that cases selected for review by circuit
judges would differ markedly from those the Court itself would select
merits examination. Perhaps the assumption is correct, but this system will offer little restraint to the Court when it decides the selected
cases, which by most selective criteria will be rich material for an aggressive Court. The cases the article decries were pushed upward by
significant political forces. The question was not whether they
47

ROBERT

F.

NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES

(1989).
48 See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939); Ohio v. Wyandotte Cheins. Corp.,
401 U.S. 493 (1971) (claiming power to decline to exercise original jurisdiction as long as
it would not disserve any of the principal policies underlying Article III). The Wyandotte
doctrine was extended in Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976), to a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
OF JUDI)HCL
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presented questions of national importance. Rather, the question was
who ought to decide them and when. I am not persuaded that few, if
any, of the decisions relied upon would not have reached the Court
under the proposed rearrangements. The very process of decision
making by the Court has conformed to its role of governance. A circuit screen will not reach this ingrained process.
As Professor Nagel has explained, it is in the conception of legal
principles preliminary to their application that policy choices are
made: "[M]uch of the Justices' intellectual energy is not directed at
the actual resolution of cases at hand. It is directed at the difficult,
complex, but preliminary, issue of determining the proper test to be
applied in a defined class of cases. '49 This type of decision making
"emphasizes the personal responsibility of the judges at the level of
policy determination." He continues that "the modern Court's emphasis on doctrine selection expresses and consolidates a radical shift
5°
in role from adjudicator to regulator.
So, it is fair to ask, is the objective of the proposal unattainable?
The Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
stated:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must
be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation
of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law. Their
belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from
their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their consti51
tutional ideals.
Must we accept this stunning assertion?
My answer is no. Ahile I do not see the excesses of the Court in
apocalyptic terms, I must agree that over the past seventy or so years
there has been a steady flow of power from the Executive and Legislative branches to the Court. Yet, much of this flow has occurred
through delivery rather than judicial usurpation. At the same time,
supra note 47, at 148.
Id.
51
505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Most Competent Branches:A Response to ProfessorPaulsen, 83 GEt. L.J. 347, 347 (1994). Professor Eisgruber's article aptly opens by contrasting this quotation from Casy with a 1861
statement of Abraham Lincoln:
[I]f the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court...
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.
See Eisgruber, supra, at 347 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1861), reprinted in INAUGURAI ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 To GEORC,E BUhH 1989, S. Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
133, 139 (1989)).
49
50

NAGEL,
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this movement to the Court has been uneven. To my eyes legal doctrine and principle afford the more powerful restraints; there are doctrines and approaches to decision making that cabin the wellintentioned, solution-driven justice. And here, along with the courts,
the academy has had substantial influence. In recent years the response of persons sharing Professors Carrington and Cramton's concerns have urged restraint as a doctrinal base, drawing upon the work
of Justice Frankfurter and Professor Bickel, among others.
That is not to say that such principles have not themselves been
abused. There is an argument, fair as far as it goes, that runs as follows: Restraint was once the conservative mantra, at least when the
Court was seen as being aggressively left of center. But conservatives
became less interested as the locus moved to a more centrist and right
path. That is, the doctrine of judicial restraint came to have little
purchase with those in the majority. To undo "legislative" decision by
the federal courts was not seen to violate the conservative principle of
judicial restraint. Here the academy can be faulted as well, to the extent that it embraces outcomes it likes at the price of overlooking the
reasoning and aggressiveness of the Court. Brown v. Board of Education
is often highlighted here. As I have explained, the Court's invalidation of "separate but equal" is defensible although some of its "implementing decisions" as well as many of the lower court decisions that
the Court refused to review are good examples of what happens when
desired results cloud decisional principles in the hands of academic
reviewers. Baker v. Carr is a better example. The point is that you
cannot have it both ways if you claim restraintist principles, and not
just expeditious political tools.
CONCLUSION

All of these principles and interpretive mantras have their utility
as well as their limits. A focus upon structure, constitutional text, and
history is an important part of defining the meaning of the Constitution despite the reality that the text is most often open-ended and
history only a second puzzle to solve the first.5 2 There is also the real52 In general, historians recognize more than jurists and legal scholars that history
will rarely itself be stable or immune from change and contestation. See C. VANN WOOD
XWARD,THINKING BACK: THE PERILS OF WRITING HISTORY 3-4 (1986) ("Mr. Justice Holmes,
we are told, cherished a quotation from Henrik Ibsen. 'Truths,' said the playwright, 'are by
no means the wiry Methuselahs some people think them. A normally constituted truth
lives-let us say-as a rule, seventeen or eighteen years; at the outside twenty, seldom
longer. And truths so stricken in years are always shockingly thin.' . .. Historians, perhaps
more than some other truth seekers and vendors, may resent ascription of such ephemerality to the truths of their trade, particularly truths of their own devising. As for myself, I do
not for a moment accept it in any literal sense. That is not to deny, however, that the older
and more experienced historians will in their time have seen enough normally constituted
truths come and go, wither and fade, to recognize in Ibsen's pronouncement an element
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ity that the historical record of the Convention of 1787 and the ratifi53
cation of the Constitution and its Amendments is far from complete.
The decisional enterprise must confront these realities in discerning
the constitutional value and apply it to contemporary affairs. Ahile a
difficult path to travel, even to objective, non-tendentious eyes, it is a
necessary path to secure the Constitution's textual tethers.
Significantly, the effort here differs from common law decision
making in one critical respect. The value choice must be that of the
organic instrument. Once made, the cases that follow will be decided
by common law, analogical reasoning-the claimed skill of the lawyer.
Absent firm legislative guidance, a common law court will make the
value choice itself, such as by adopting comparative fault and rejecting
contributory negligence. By contrast, with constitutional questions,
there is a threshold inquiry the Court is duty bound to make: must we
decide this constitutional question in order to discharge our duty to
decide the case before us? The question then is not that this case
affords an opportunity to decide; rather, it is whether the case demands
it. I call this strong version versus weak version Marbury, and it lies at
the heart of the ill the authors' proposal would remedy. Chief Justice
Marshall's claimed justification in Marbuiy is available only to those
decisions that adhere to this restraint-regardless of who decides
whether the Court decides a case. The marble palace sits as a temple
on the hill isolated and removed from the tumult of daily events. It
presents a sense of timeless disinterest and detachment stirring our
inner yearnings for dispassionate justice, offering a rule of law that
implements settled expectations.
Although aspirational, this is misleading. The Court is not so detached today, and it never has been. Like it or not, it is better seen as
resting on an ethos of the people that has flowed as a river across our
history. An ethos of commitment to the rule of law, of fair treatment
for all persons before the courts. An ethos that offers a secular framework to bring order to a disorderly world. It is a powerful force
whether viewed as tradition and custom, or as I do, the critical ethos
that makes law work. A constitution set apart from this ethos would
be brittle indeed. A look at the Brazilian constitutions, any of them,
when laid over the reality of its government, is instructive. The tolerance of executive power runs throughout that country's long history,
and the separation of powers expressed in their constitutions are betrayed by its longstanding toleration of generals-in-charge. The Amerof truth about truths, even the truths of history. Those historians who have worked at their
calling long enough to acknowledge responsibility for ideas past the alleged normal lifespan will have cause for personal reflections.").
53 For these materials and their attendant difficulties, see James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentao Record, 65 TtX. L. RnV. 1 (1986).
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ican ethos just as powerfully poses its demands for freedoms and
democratic government.
The Court is a captive of this ethos. V'While its decisions may stray
along the way, these forces external to the Court will have their way.
The enterprise of examining structure, text, and history in no small
measure would tap into this ethos. But that is a far more difficult task
for the judiciary. It comes more easily to the representative branches,
over time. That said, the judicial branch in my view is not the sole
arbiter of constitutional values. All three branches have that task and
all make law. Nevertheless, the courts are the most competent to re54
solve cases, and in doing so, they make law.

54

Eisgruber, supr note 51.
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